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Abstract 
 
A smooth functioning of capital markets is an important prerequisite for the development of new ven-
tures. Based on existing studies and interviews with key actors in the market this paper specifies the 
functions of financial institutions as ‘filters’, ‘hubs’ and ‘catalysts’. It further investigates if these func-
tions are distorted by recent trends at the capital market.  
The literature on financial intermediation has frequently been split into two different strands. On the 
one hand, studies have dealt with the role of financial intermediation in innovation systems and the 
specific financial institutions that make up the financing system. However, it has rarely been dis-
cussed what is actually going on in this intermediation. On the other hand, a number of micro-level 
studies have focused upon the single transaction, for example exploring the (contractual) relations 
between investor and investee from a principal-agent perspective, or discussing the impact of infor-
mation asymmetries between a lender and a borrower.  
The contribution of this paper is to bridge these two approaches by discussing the nature of the in-
termediation process at a micro-level, whilst at the same time to investigate the impact of the devel-
opment of the innovation- and financial system.  
 
Venture capital firms are particular relevant for entrepreneurs as they act as filters, hubs and catalysts 
for entrepreneurial firms. Networks are important pre-conditions for fulfilling these functions, but just 
as there are differences between financial institutions there are differences in the configuration and 
nature of the networks they use. The cost of building competences and networks are often sunk and 
cannot easily be reallocated to other relationships.  
 
Recently venture capital firms in Europe have moved upwards in the size of target firms and size of 
investments, leaving smaller firms deprived of financing. As a result there is now a quantitative, pecu-
niary financing vacuum. Venture capital firms have over time created networks and can be denoted 
‘extended knowledge bases’ that are geared towards assisting specific types of investments. Net-
works are thus specific to the stage of investments or industry that venture capital firms target their 
investments. However, this investment in building a web of complementary competencies risks being 
destructed by the recent trend of shifting focus of investment targets. Capital is easily moved to other 
target firms, whereas networks and competencies involves time and costs to build. 
 
Some of the implications involved are that it may be necessary to not only fill the pecuniary gaps at the 
capital market, but rather the bridging of relationships between actors at the market may be an important 
task. 
 
 
Keywords: Venture capital, financial intermediation, entrepreneurship, networks, financing gap. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Generally financial institutions and markets support entrepreneurship by granting credit and channel-
ling savings to investments. However, as simple as it may sound the specific mechanisms behind this 
process are diverse and complex involving a wide range of different financial institutions.  
 
The literature on this has often tended to be in two separate strands. On the one hand sys-
temic/macro oriented studies have been rather general, focusing on the role of finance in innovation 
systems, rather than the workings of specific financial institutions that make up this financing system 
(Christensen, 1992, Zysman, 1983 and numerous later contributions using the framework of capital 
market based and bank-oriented financial systems).  
 
On the other hand a number of micro-level studies have focused upon the single transaction or the 
interaction between two actors, for example exploring the (contractual) relations between investor and 
investee from a principal-agent perspective (Sheperd and Zacharakis, 2001, Reid, 1999), or discuss-
ing the impact of information asymmetries between a lender and a borrower (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981, Leland and Pyle, 1977).   
 
The contribution of this paper is to bridge these two approaches by discussing the nature of the in-
termediation process at a micro-level, whilst at the same time to put it in a more general perspective 
of the innovation and financial system. Hence this paper discusses the functions fulfilled by financial 
institutions and the impact of the system in which these functions are embedded. A specific type of 
financial intermediary is in focus. Venture capital is argued to be a type of financial institution particu-
lar relevant for entrepreneurs as they are acting as filters, catalysts and hubs for entrepreneurial 
firms. It is, however, important to consider also the interplay and division of labour with other actors 
on the market; the financial system in which venture capital firms function. Networks is an important 
pre-condition for fulfilling these functions. Just as there are differences between financial institutions 
and the transactions and functions they undertake there are also important differences in the net-
works they use. This paper highlights requirements for efficient use of networks and discuss if they 
are currently at risk of being dismantled caused be recent trends in the venture capital market.  
 
This paper proceeds with discussion of financing innovation and entrepreneurship. It is shown how 
systemic features impact on micro relations. Section three shows in more detail what are the three 
functions mentioned above. The preconditions for fulfilling these functions are laid out in section four. 
It is discussed at the end of this explorative paper if the recent development in the venture capital 
market may have seriously distorted the three functions in a manner that produce a financing gap, 
which is more than a pecuniary one, rather more qualitative and lasting.  
 
 
2. Basic features of the role of financial capital in entrepreneurship 
 
2.1 Standard perceptions of the functioning of financial markets – mar-
ket-based, transactional financial markets and relational markets 
 
Financial markets are often seen in traditional finance theories as working close to a perfect competi-
tion situation. Prices are seen as being rapidly cleared on a central market where all agents have all 
the relevant information. The market-based, transactional financial markets are characterised by a 
relatively high degree of standardisation of transactions. The bond market is an example. The “prod-
ucts” traded are homogeneous and transactions are based on information which is primarily general, 
articulated and public. The direct contact between the trading parties is either limited or absent 
(Neave, 1991).   
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Contrary, the relational type of financial transactions are often based on private, tacit, specific infor-
mation and this information is often asymmetrically distributed. The information on transactions is of-
ten kept between two parties who negotiate on a private basis using information closely related to a 
specific project or firm. The interaction between the parties is intense and the high degree of asym-
metries of information and the fact that risks are non-calculable, makes trust important to the interplay 
between the parties. This means that initial screening costs are relatively high and that the screening 
to a large extent is on assessing the abilities and willingness of specific people rather than a bond-
issuing institution or the likely development of a pool of shares.  The transaction and assessments are 
more related to the character of the two, or more parties involved and the actual use of the capital 
supplied rather than the “product” itself. An example is what have been denoted the business angels 
market. 
 
Capabilities to handle these different kinds of transactions differ according to which type of financing 
or in other terms governance mechanism is chosen. In general, the more transactions are character-
ised by uncertainty and discretion, the more screening and monitoring capabilities are needed (Wil-
liamson, 1988). In contrast, frequently occurring standard transactions under risk, need limited 
screening and monitoring, and learning effects are reduced to a minimum (Haubrich, 1989, Neave, 
1991). 
 
2.2 The division of labour of financial institutions – implications for en-
trepreneurship 
 
In order to minimise costs in transactions and to focus competencies many financial institutions spe-
cialise, often resulting in a division of labour between financial institutions. Segmentation of the mar-
ket and the division of labour depends on the demand and the competition in the market between fi-
nancial institutions. Therefore, the existing segmentation of the market is not static. Through learning 
processes and strategic efforts to develop competencies financial institutions engage in new areas of 
businesses.  
 
Through this dynamic process financial institutions are specialised in different areas of business with 
respect to which stage of development (or size) of the firm they primarily finance; which amount they 
typically finance; the type of capital; the time horizon; the degree of interaction and advice to the firm. 
In some cases there may even be a geographical specialisation (Christensen, 2007). This gives room 
for a complementarily between financial institutions. By financing e.g. different stages of develop-
ment, the firms may supplement each other. Venture capital firms are part of a wider system where 
important institutions feed venture capital firms with relevant investment opportunities by financing the 
seed phase of firms just as there are financing mechanisms for taking over the relay after venture 
capital firms have financed the entrepreneurial firm.  
 
 
3. Specific functions of venture capital firms in financing entrepre-
neurship 
 
The above needs to be further detailed and related to the functions that venture capital firms under-
take in the relationship to the entrepreneurs. Although there is some overlap them these functions are 
filters, hubs and catalysts. They nevertheless facilitate understanding of the nature of this special in-
termediation process. 
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3.1 Filtering ‘good’ and ‘bad’ projects 
 
There will always be debate on if there is a lack of financial capital or absence of good investment 
opportunities. This debate will never be resolved because a good investment opportunity will only 
show to be ‘good’ ex post, whereas the investment decision must be taken ex ante. Regardless of the 
debate, there is no doubt that there has to be barriers to financing entrepreneurship. It would be so-
cially inexpedient to have too little restrictions on financing entrepreneurship. Venture capital firms 
participate in this ex ante selection of good and bad projects and are as such important filters in rela-
tion to entrepreneurial projects. The ability to fulfil this filtering task is an important element in a well-
functioning financial system. 
 
In fact even in a pre-screening phase venture capital firms have a filtering effect. By signalling criteria 
for investments and requirements to the content and quality of the business plan venture capital firms 
filter out some entrepreneurs who cannot meet the criteria and requirements.  
 
What has been labelled the new economy’ (OECD, 2000) might challenge the way venture capital 
firms operate and fulfil this function. When firms are increasingly based upon intangibles, the due dili-
gence and screening of potential investments changes. Traditional models for assessing the value of 
a firm are often inadequate, for example the cash flow is often absent, as is collateral. To a much lar-
ger extent, the initial screening is based upon assessing ”knowledge assets”, the quality and unique-
ness, volatility, and whether the knowledge is subject to fluctuations, for example  by heavy reliance 
on the knowledge of one person, who may move from the organisation.  
 
3.2 Venture capital as hubs 
 
The hub function concerns the fact that venture capital firms often act as a networker. Venture capital 
firms provide links between the firm and external partners (Florida and Kenney, 1988). In particular, 
venture capital firms typically help portfolio firms with links to other, complementary financing sources 
(Christensen, 2006). Moreover, the venture capital financing of a firm may function as a signal ena-
bling firms to have reputational capital when negotiating with other business partners (Frederiksen, 
1997, Shane and Cable, 2002). Therefore, the venture capital firms may have an indirect effect on 
other external partners. This has even been claimed to be so valuable that firms are willing to pay a 
premium to be affiliated or financed by venture capital (Hsu, 2004). Second, the venture capital firms 
may have a direct mediating role in that they try to stimulate synergies between portfolio firms.  
 
Networks among the venture capital firms is another important feature of the hub function of venture 
capital. Even early in venture capital research, (Bygrave, 1987) it was found that such networks and 
syndications are valuable not just as a measure for spreading risk but also, and as the primary rea-
son, for sharing knowledge and learning. In venture capital firms with portfolios of high technology 
and/or early stage firms networking is more intense (ibid.). This is probably explained by the higher 
asymmetry of information in such firms. More recent studies of venture capital networks (Hochbert et 
al., 2007) even find that networked venture capital firms perform better, not only because networks 
are important access to good deal flow and screening, as mentioned by Stuart and Sorensen (2001), 
but also because it allows them to provide better post-investment assistance. Because of the above-
mentioned attractiveness of venture capital financing, and high performing or prestigious venture 
firms in particular, the reverse causality may be working: because of good performance venture capi-
tal firms are able to improve their networking position. 
 
This web of contacts constitute what may be denoted an extended knowledge base that may be acti-
vated when assisting the portfolio firms. Efficiency in the firm may increase as a result of interaction 
with a venture capital firm because an increased stock of expertise and advice will become available 
through the network of the venture capital firm (Hochbert et al., 2007). It is likely that the venture capital 
firms may be an entrance to e.g. important industrial collaborators, allowing for synergies among the 
portfolio firms. Florida and Kenney (1988) see venture capitalists as being both in between and cen-
tral to several different types of networks such as the financial network, a network used in the location 
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of investment opportunities and their screening, a third network consisting of accounting firms, law-
yers, consultants, and other professional service firms, and a personal network used to ensure the 
human resources in the entrepreneurial firm concerning both management and technical aspects. 
 
An additional 'hub-function' is that the venture capital firms’ function as an entrance for other types of 
investors to this very risky part of the market of financing knowledge based entrepreneurs.  Navigat-
ing in such a market requires competencies, which are costly to build up and maintain. Therefore, 
many investors, who want to participate in this segment of investment opportunities, do so by invest-
ing in venture funds rather than establishing independent, new entities. Alternatively they syndicate 
investments and let the syndicating partner act as lead investor.  
 
The hub function also comes into play when venture capital firms receive proposals outside their in-
vestment range and redirect applicants to other venture capital firms or totally other types of financing 
sources. Information on the most suitable venture capital firm or other financing source is not always 
readily available to entrepreneurs or small or new firms.  
 
A final hub function is that venture capital, through time limits on their ownership, may function as an in-
termediate step before bringing the firm to another stage of development, often by way of trade sale to 
another industrial partner.  
 
It may be concluded that theories on the entrepreneur - venture capital firm interaction must take into 
account not only the information and knowledge of the two parties in question, but also the wider envi-
ronment in which they are parts, especially the contribution of the network of the two parties in this re-
spect. The literature has primarily focused upon dyads.  
 
3.3 Venture capital as catalysts of entrepreneurial processes 
 
Venture capital firms may catalyze high-tech start-ups in a number of ways. Venture capital firms fi-
nance and assist firms, as discussed below, but it is now also the case that venture capital firms ac-
tively start up firms by way of licensing good ideas and hire talent to create a firm to carry out the 
commercialisation of the idea. This pattern has emerged in particular in the bio-tech industry. 
 
Another way to catalyze entrepreneurship is a more indirect and societal way in that success stories 
of venture-backed high-growth entrepreneurs are stimulating both incentives to start-up and the 
awareness of venture capital as a possible source of financing and excel the growth of the business. 
The impact on catalyzing knowledge-based entrepreneurship of these success stories is difficult to 
estimate but is likely to be huge.  
 
A third way of catalyzing innovation and high-tech entrepreneurship is the ability of venture capital 
firms to use their broad and deep flows of information and knowledge on technological opportunities 
to enhance a wave of technological development that may challenge or re-direct the existing techno-
logical trajectory. While the impact of venture capital may not be strong enough to create new techno-
logical trajectories and be drivers of new industries, then they are important in catalyzing the com-
mercialisation of newly developed technologies in their emerging phase. They are in this sense part 
of the commercialisation and wider diffusion of the technologies developed (Mason & Harrison, 1999). 
 
The exact socio-economic impact of financing innovation in general, and in particular venture capital, 
is difficult to estimate. However, it seems to an established perception that even if venture capital 
overall is only financing a very small proportion of firms and hence may seem of neglect able impor-
tance, then venture capital may be important for certain segments of firms, in particular those in focus 
at this ECEI-conference; new, innovative, entrepreneurial firms. 
 
A fourth way to catalyze entrepreneurship through venture capital is that venture capital firms provide 
post-investment nursing of the portfolio firms. This enables the venture capital firms to assist the de-
velopment of the portfolio firm, and may through this involvement function as a catalyst for growth 
processes within the investee firm (Mason & Harrison, 1999, Christensen, 2006). Venture capital 
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firms function in their monitoring and assistance to firms as providers of both general business knowl-
edge like marketing, strategy, additional financing and of social capital and network access. Results 
from empirical surveys indicate that relations to other financing sources, and contacts and networks, 
are at the top of the list of contributions. This supports the arguments about venture capital firms as 
hubs for entrepreneurs. 
 
4. Requirements to fulfil the specific functions of venture capital 
firms in entrepreneurship 
 
The previously described functions are very important features of a well-functioning system for financ-
ing knowledge based entrepreneurship. It may be argued that they now have become much more 
explicit and subject to formation of specialised organisations (OECD, 1996). 
 
It seems clear that an important precondition for fulfilling these functions is the competencies of the ven-
ture capital firm, which is closely related to their specialisation. When focused upon specific segments of 
the market the possibilities of building up relevant competences increase. Moreover, and related, the 
place of the single venture capital firm in the division of labour between the institutions on the financial 
market is determining the possibilities of functioning as hubs, catalysts and filters of entrepreneurs.  
 
In contrast, the entrepreneur may need competencies in economic management and in preparing and 
presenting a business plan. Often the competencies of the venture capital firm and the entrepreneur are 
separate. This disparity is not necessarily a disadvantage; a complement of competencies is important. 
Nevertheless, the parties should be able to talk together using the same codes, and should not be too far 
apart.  
 
These complementarities may also apply to not only competencies within the dyad, but also with regard 
to the networks of the two parties. According to Granovetter (1973) networks may be characterised by 
strong or weak ties that each have their advantages. Strong ties involve frequent contact and exchange 
of private information. Over time, both codes of transmitting information become more efficient and the 
information becomes homogeneous. Tacit knowledge is most efficiently transferred through this type of 
relationship. Networks with weak ties primarily involve less frequent contacts and more heterogeneous 
knowledge. They are important in bridging different networks and may function as an entrance to these 
(Burt, 1992). The latter is important in this connection because it extends the knowledge base. Applied to 
this case there are usually strong ties between the venture capital firm and entrepreneur as previously 
discussed. But the networks of the entrepreneur and venture capital firm respectably differ. Often 
networks of an entrepreneur are characterised by strong ties as the knowledge related to start up is often 
narrow but private, sometimes even based in the family or friends, or affiliated persons of the team 
starting up the business. The venture capitalist typically has a broad knowledge of different types of 
knowledge resources (Fiet, 1995). Because of the strong ties between venture capital firm and 
entrepreneur the venture capital firm may function as a hub to these diverse, weaker networks (Hansen 
et al., 2000). 
 
It can be stated that the hub, filter and catalyst functions are in turn more easily fulfilled when there is 
close proximity between the two parties, ‘close’ being partly comparable to the strong or weak ties dis-
cussion above. This proximity may unfold in several dimensions. Boschma (2005) mentions five types of 
proximity; cognitive, organizational, social, institutional, and geographical. All of these types of proximity 
are relevant to the analysis of the relationship between venture capital firms and entrepreneurs. How-
ever, there are both pros and cons of this proximity, the main pitfall being the risk of lock-in as the incen-
tives for searching other, more rational opportunities may decrease. The implication of the strong or weak 
ties discussion is also that the extent to which close proximity is an advantage relates to the type of 
knowledge that needs to be transmitted. 
 
As mentioned, the very transmission of information is easier when relationships have been estab-
lished and ways of communication that are understandable by both parties have been worked out. 
Such close relationships tend to be stable, which may be both beneficial and a disadvantage. This 
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dichotomy has to do with several features of the relationships. One is the mutual irreversible depend-
ence that develops between the entrepreneur and the venture capital firm once the deal has been ac-
cepted. Even if the project does not show the expected performance, the venture capital firm has an 
interest in keeping the entrepreneur solvent as long as there are still opportunities related to the 
product of the firm. It is likely that venture capital firms are reluctant to withdraw from the deal. Entre-
preneurs may also incur considerable costs in breaking up the relationship. First, the entrepreneur will 
have to pay the costs of searching for a new financier and building up new codes and channels of 
communication. Second, other venture capital firms may perceive a broken relationship as an indica-
tion that the previous venture capital firm had discovered information on the entrepreneur that may 
harm the situation. In summary, the mere shift of financial connection may harm the reputation of the 
innovator, and consequently, other financial institutions may charge a cautiousness premium to cover 
for this potential, hidden information. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion: are trends in the venture capital 
market creating a financing and networking vacuum? 
 
The venture capital industry in Europe has matured. One indicator of this is increased specialisation 
and division of labour between the venture capital firms, another is that the share of private monies 
flowing into the industry has risen. However, the recent trend in Europe is also that venture capital 
firms have moved upwards in the size of target firms and size of investments, (and size of venture 
capital funds) leaving smaller firms deprived of financing. In several European countries, we now see 
a heavy involvement of public money in the seed or early stage segment of the market. In some 
countries more than 90% of investments include public money. The rationale for this public interven-
tion is that there is a financing gap due to this development in the market. 
 
It may be speculated if there is now not only a quantitative, pecuniary financing vacuum. Venture 
capital firms have over time created networks and ‘extended knowledge bases’ that are geared to-
wards assisting specific types of investments such as investments in certain stages of the life cycle of 
a firm. Likewise, the accumulated experiences in venture capital firms are often within a particular 
technological area or industry in which the venture capitalists develop networks (Berglund et al., 
2007). Although dissolution of networks under some circumstances may be beneficial to avoid lock-in, 
then it may also be that it actually destroys huge investments in the establishment of the prevailing 
division of labour on the market and in the networks build up over time. For public policy actors it may 
be necessary to not only fill the pecuniary gaps at the capital market, but rather the bridging of relation-
ships between actors at the market may be an important task. 
 
According to the literature, networks have been argued to be spatially bounded. Spatial proximity may 
be important because the networks among venture capital firms themselves are also important sources 
of information, and this type of information is not publicly available (Shane and Cable, 2002).  However, 
they may also be specific to the stage of investments that venture capital firms target their invest-
ments. It requires different competences to invest in different firms of different size (Berg-Utby et al., 
2007), therefore networks are build in a manner that is specific to the division of labour on the finan-
cial market. This division of labour has evolved over time and has required time and effort to estab-
lish. However, these investments in building a web of complementary competencies risk being de-
structed by the recent trend of shifting focus of investment targets. It could be maintained that in the 
short run changes in investment targets and new partners in the financing system is just an extension 
of networks rather than destruction. However, in a longer time perspective they are likely to be de-
structed. To take one example, the venture capital part of the capital market was until the burst of the 
IT bubble characterised by complementarities through syndication and networking between business 
angels and institutional venture capital. When the institutional venture capital afterwards moved up-
wards in their target for investments this left the business angels with the burden of financing more 
rounds of financing than the initial financing and with a lack of the options of benefiting from the net-
works of venture capital firms. Evidence for this, and indications of the consequences, is the fact that 
co-investment schemes have become widespread.  
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Essentially, venture capital firms, when looking at situations of unprofitable terminations of a deal, will 
consider not only the capital involved but also the time and effort that were spent setting up the informa-
tion exchange and developing trust. In many cases, the costs of building competences and networks are 
sunk and often cannot be reallocated to other relationships. Therefore, the higher the exit costs from a 
relationship, the more the sunk costs are the glue in the relationship and in the market. This goes both at 
a micro-level between the entrepreneur and the venture capital firm and at a macro-level where a certain 
division of labour between financial institutions has been established. 
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